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UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF TIlE FOREIGN'LANGUAGE LAW.

-In view of the present wide-spread discussion of ways and means
of absorbing our immense foreign-born population in the American
melting-pot and thus preventing the threatened destruction of our institutions. the recent series of cases in the Supreme Court involving
the foreign language statutes of various states has an especial significance. Of course a state may compel the teaching of English in
all schools within its borders.' Recently some of the states have attempted to go further in their effort to make English the common
Meyer v. Nebraska. 43 Sup. Ct. 625, 628 (1923).
"(46)
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speech of the nation in fact. and of all, not merely the majority, of
its people.
The legislatures in Ohio, Iowa and Nebraska passed statutes
prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages in any public, parochial

or private school under the eighth grade.2 These statutes were attacked in the courts as being violative of the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Anienlnient to the Federal Constitution. The highest courts of all three states held these laws constitutional.2 but ini
each instance the case was appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court, by vote of 7 to 2, held the statutes
unconstitutional in each case. 4 While the court recognized tile desi:ability of the object which the statute was designed to effect, it
held that the means by which the state sought to accomplish this
purpose were prohibited by the Constitution, and constituted a deprivation of personal liberty without due process of law.
It is well settled that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Aumendment includes the liberty to contract and to engage in any
useful employment. " under which head the teaching of modem languages must fall. The court extends this definition of liberty further in Meyer z,. Nebraska,' to the right to acquire useful knowledge, and the right of parents to control the education of their
children. Although some of these things seenm to have their first
recognition in this case as among the liberties safeguarded by the
'The Nebraska Statute contains the following provisions:
" "Section i. No person, individually- or as a teacher, shall, in any
private, denominational, parochial or public school, teach any subject to
any person ini any language than the English language.
"Section 2. Languages other than the English language, may be
taught as languages only after a pupil shall have attained and successfully- passed the eighth grade as- evidenced by a certificate of gradiiation
issued by the county superintendent of the county in- which the child
resides.
"Section 3. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this
act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall
be subject to a fine oi not less than twenty-five dollars ($2S), nor more
than one hundred dollars ($ioo), or be confined in the county jail for a
period not exceeding thirty days for each offense.
"Section 4. Whereas an emergency exists, this act shall be in force
from and after its passage and approval."
The Iowa and Ohio statutes are similar. See Bartels v. Iowa, 43 Sup.
Ct. 628, 629 (1923).
'Meyer v. Nebraska. wa7 Neb. 67, 187 N. W. ioo (gz2) ; Pohl v. State,
io2
474, 132 N. E. 2 (921) ; State v. Bartels, 191 Iowa io6o, 181 N.
W. Ohio
So8 (1921).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 43 Sup. Ct. 625 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 43 Sup.
Ct. 628 (1923); Pohl v. Ohio, 43 Sup. Ct. 628 (1923).
'Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897). The cases in which this
idea of liberty has been developed, beginning with the Slaughter House Cases
in 1872 and carried through to the Minimum Wage Law Case in 1923, are
collected in Meyer v. Nebraska, 43 Sup. Ct. 625, 626.
' Supra in note 4, at p. 627.
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Constitution, yet no one will doubt that they are rightly to be considered as among these protected liberties. Therefore any arbitrary
curtailment of their enjoyment by the legislatures is a violation of
due process.7
The prohibition against teaching one class of studies is certainly
an arbitrary restriction of these liberties, unless some very pressing
consideration of public welfare demands it. Justice Holmes, in a
not too convincing dissent, admits that a prohibition against the
teaching of the German languages is unconstitutional, s yet rather
inconsistently declares that the prohibition against all modern languages is within the state's right to impose. But it seems that the
danger apprehended by the legislature was the inculcation of foreign
rather than American ideals into the minds of children of the immigrants. Considering the diversity of the political ideals in various
countries, some harmonizing with our own, others antagonistic in
varying degrees, it seems that if one admits with Justice Holmes that
the legislature can prohibit the teaching of all foreign languages, one
should admit as a corollary that it can prohibit any one language, if
it be the native language of the people with ideals antagonistic to
our own. The learned Justice seems to infer that foreign languages,
like foreign citizens, are entitled to equal protection of the laws.
The basis of the majority opinion, however, seems sound. The
right to teach, and the right to acquire an education in, the ordinary
branches of knowledge are among the fundamental liberties which
are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. They cannot be taken
away, therefore, by the legislature, except by due process of law, that
is to say, by a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state.
In an emergency the police power would probably extend this far.
During the War in 1917-i918, it would seem that a prohibition of
the teaching of German in the schools would be a valid exercise of
the police power in preserving the state from the dangers of very
probable enemy propaganda.9 But in times of peace, with no warclouds on the horizon, the danger from foreign influence does not
seem so great as to justify this serious repression of individual freedom. The threat to the safety of the state is too remote to warrant this decided abridgment of personal liberty. The question of the
undigested immigrant has become serious in the United-States. But
it has not yet become so critical that we must adopt this un-American method to Americanize our new citizens.
G.F.F.
t

See Truax v. Raich,

239

U. S. 33 (1915); Purity Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.

S. 192 (1912).

*Bartels v. Iowa, 43 Sup. Ct. 628, 630 (1923).
' Thus the regulation of rents during the war and post-war period was
permitted in New York and the District of Columbia in the emergency
caused by the housing shortage in New York City and.Washington. Block
v. Hirsh. 256 U. S. 135 (1921); Mar.cus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256
U. S. 1o (1921).

NOTES
TiiE EFFECT OF TIE DISCLOSURE OF AGENCY -INSIMPLE WRIt-

TEN COINTRACTS.-Although many of the rigid rules of law which
were applied in connection with sealed and negotiable instruments
at common law have never been applied to simple written contracts,
the product of a busy, hasty and informal age, in theory there was
a residuum of formality still hedging such contracts about, which prevented the introduction of parol evidence to vary their apparent
meaning. The rule was often described as "undebatable," that parol
could not be introduced to vary the effect of a simple written contract, complete on its face, and of obvious meaning.' But the many
"exceptions" which have crept into the law have made it most debatable today in every jurisdiction, whether the apparent effect of
any written instrument cannot be undermined by a rule of law by
which "the real intentions of the parties," unexpressed in the writing, can be introduced by parol. Therefore the rules of law applicable to cases in which an agency is alleged as a defense to a suit
against a person whom a contract appears to bind personally, are
alwavs subject to the almost daily fluctuations of the rules of evidlence in respect to the admission of parol.
However, putting aside this qualification, a considerable body of
substantive law has been built around situations in which a simple
written contract, not under seal. can grammatically and logically be
construed as the personal obligation of an agent sued thereon. Such
a contract as "The A. Company by its president, B, undertakes, etc.,
..
"which 13 has signed with or without words indicating a rep.
resentative capacity, would not come within the scope of this discussion. The law relating to the corresponding obligation of public
officers. executors, trustees, etc., is also in a somewhat different field.2
The form of an unsealed written contract is never material,
the question being entirely one of the expressed intent of the parties, = unless such writing is so ambiguous as to make a sure construction imposgible.' Hence in the four general classes of situations
to be discussed, it makes no difference whether the words indicative
of a representative capacity are found in the body of the contract or
in the signature.
'.Naumberg v. Young, 44 N. J. L. 331 (1882); Hebb v. Welsh, I85 Mass.
335, 7o N. E. 416 (9o4) ; Mechem, Agency (2d ed. 1914), Sec. 1176.
1
Barlow v. Congregational Society, 8 Allen 460 (Mass. 1864); Winship
v. Smith, 6i Me. uS (1869); Whitney v. Wyman, 1o U. S. 392 (1879);
Story, Agency (ioth ed.), Sec. 154, (quoting): "If it can, upon the whole
instrumept, be collected that the object and intent of it are to bind the principal, and not merely the agent, courts of justice will adopt that construction

of it. no matter how informally it may be expressed."
AMahoney v. Kukuli, 14 C. B. 390 (Eng. 1854); King v. Handy, z 11.
Anp. 212 (1878) ; Wing v.Glick, 56 Iowa 473, 9 N. W. 384 (188x) ; Falk v.
.Mocbs, 127 U. S. 597 (i888); Mechem, Agency (2d ed. 1914), Sec. 1166.
,
'Turner v. Thomas, io Mo. App. 338 (i88i); Society of Shakers v.
Watson, x5 C. C. A. 632, 68 Fed. 730 (x895).
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In the simplest and most common case of the sort, where the
party sought to be held personally liable on a contract has added
such words as "agent,*' -treasurer," etc., to his signature, it has been
generally held that the words are mere descriptio persone, and not
sufficient proof of an intention not to be personally bound.' The
sane is true where the word appears both in the signature and in the
body of the instrument.
in the second class of cases, the signature is followed by a
statement of the signer's capacity as representative of a named principal, as "Smith, agent of Jones." Courts have generally applied the
sane rule, holding the agent liable whether the words are found in
the signature 1 or in the body
Some diversity of opinion is observed in cases in which the
word -for- is placed between the word denoting representation and
the namne of the principal, as "Jones, agent for Smith." In the majority of jurisdictions such a signature will release the agent, though
this is by no means universal." Yet the agent is bound where the
principal is not described specifically, but merely by words of description such as "nierchants" or -owners." " He is not liable if
the words, though identifying no one on their face, were nevertheless clearly intelligible to the parties, as "the owners of the ship
',Ajax:," or in-itials. 1
Mead v. Altgeld, 136 111. 289, 28 N. E. 54 (i89x ; Gavazza v. Plummer,
53 Wash. 14, tot Pac. 370 (i909); Manning v. Embert, 126 Md. 545, 95 Adt.
64 (1910); United Electric Co. v. Blackton, 128 N. Y. S. 92 (i9ii); Mechem,
Agency (2d ed. 1914), See. 1170.
'Booth v. Farmers' Bank,.4 Lans. 3oi (N. Y. 1871); Landyskowski v.
Lark, io8 Mich. Soo, 66 N. W. 371 (i896); Candler v. DeGive, 133 Ga. 486,
66 S. E. 244 (i9o9). Contra: -ewitt v. Wheeler, 22 Conn. 557 (1853).
Burbank v. Posey, 7 Bush 372 (Ky. 1870) ; Phillips v. Knight, 20 R. I.
624, 40 Adt. 762 (i898). Mr. Justice Gray, in Tucker v. Fairbanks, 98 Mass.
101 (1870), said: "In order to exempt the agent from liability upon an instrument executed by him within the scope of his agency, he must not only
name his principal, but he must express by some force of words that the
contract is the act of the principal, though done by the hand of the agent.
A mere description of the general relation or office which the person signing
the paper holds to another person or corporation, without indicating that
the particular signature is made in the execution of the office and agency,
is not sufficient to charge the principal or exempt the agent from personal
liability."
M ''Williams v. Willis, i Wash. 199 (Va. 1793); Avery v. Dougherty,
1o2 Ind. 443, 2 N. E. 123 (1884); Sun Printing & Pub. Ass'n v, Moore, 183
U. S. 642 (19o); Copeland v. Hewitt, 96 Me. 525, 53 Ad. 36 (ipo2).
Contra: Roberts v. Button, 14 Vt. 195 (1842); Goodenough v. Thayer, 132
Mass. 152 (1882).
'McCall v. Clayton, 44 N. C. 422 (1853); Mahoney v. KukulM, mtpra in
note 3; Walbridge v. Kilpatrlck, 9 Hun. 135 (N. Y. 1876). Contra: Crutcher
v. The Memphis R. Co., 38 Ala. 579 (1863).
"Adams v. Hall, 37 Law Times R. (N. S.) 7o (1877); Ye Sing v.
Corbitt, 9 Fed. 423 (188).
"Waddell v. Mordecai. 3 Hill 22 (S. C. 1836); King v. Handy, supra
in note 3.
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There are comparatively few cases reported in which the agent
making and signing the contract describes himself "as agent" of a
specified or unspecified principal. In the case of Universal Steam
Navigation Company, Ltd., v. McKelkie, " recently decided in the.
House of Lords, an agent was held not to have bound himself personally on a contract signed by him in which he was described simply
"as agent." This is contrary to the American case of Rollins ,,.
PIielps,'" in which the facts were practically identical, but it is in
accord with the reasoning in Hutchinson v. Tathlzn,"I n earlier
English case in which the agents were described "as agents to
nierchants" in the contract. The court in that case held the agents
liable through the force of a custom of the trade, but declared that
it could not do so were there no custom.
Where the agent is styled "as agent of" a named principal, the
cases are nearly evenly (livided ", Prior to the principal case, the
English cases held him personally responsible."' In case the body
of the contract describes the agent "as agent for A," a named principal. and he sirns "For A; 13, as agent," the combination of the
two abilitv-denving plirases releases him.17 Nor is he liable if the
contract says that the agent is buying "on account of B," 's or "for
his principal."
The principal case discards once for all the old theory, once
firmly imbedded in the law, that an agent for a foreign principal
bound only himself on any kind of a contraet3) It bad long since
lapsed into innocuous desuetude.
The decision of the principal case, Universql Steant Navigation
Conipany -,,. )IcKe&'ie. that a signature -followed by "as agent" alone
canl indicate but one idea-that a person so signinig does so only as
agenjt and not as Imincipal-seems a most logical and desirable'one.
Moreover, it was time to overrule flatly such cases as Lcnnard v.
Robinson,'" the facts of which -were stronger for the decision than

3

129 I.w Times R,
5 Minn. 463 (1861).

(N. S.) 395, May 4, 1923.

°L.R. 8 C. P. 482 -1873).Holding agent liable: Keokuk Improvement Co. v. Kingsland, 5 Okla.
32, 47 Pac. 484 (1896).
Holding agent not liable: Smith v. Morse, 9 Wall. 76 (U. -S. 1869);
Barlow v. The Congregational Society, supra in note 2.
L-ennard v. Robizson, 5 E.& B. 125 (Eng. 1855) ; Paice v. Walker, J-.
R..5 Exh. 173. 22 Jaw Times R. (N. S.) 547 (Eng. x87o).
TGreen v. KopkW, I8 C. B. 549 (Eng. z856); Deslandes v. Gregory, 2
E. & E. 602, 2 Law Times R. (N. S.) 634 (Eng, x86o).
" Weidner v. Hoggett, 35 Law Times R. (N. S.) 368 (Eng. x876); Gadd
v. Houghton. 35 Law Times R. (N.S.) 222 (Eng. 1876).
'Southwell v. Bowditch, 35 Law Times R. (N. S.) 196 (Eng. 1876).
Dc Gaillon v. L'Aigle. I B. & P. 368 (Eng. 1799); Rogers v. March,
33 Me. 106 (1851). Story. Agency, Sec. 268.
:1Supra in note i6.
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those of the principal case. the signature being "A, as agent for B"
(a named party). However, it is submitted, one cannot help remarking with surprise the dicta of Lords Slidw and Sumner, two
of the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, in the principal case, the effect
of which is to throw doubt on some of the well-established rules of
agency outlined above, in respect to descriptio pcrsonre Lord
Shaw says. "The appending of the word 'agents' to the signature of
a party to a mercantile contract is. in all cases, the dominating factor in the solution of the problem of principal or agent." It is a
"conclusive assertion of agency, and a conclusive rejection of the
responsibility of a principal, and is and must be accepted in that
two-fold sense of meaning by the other contracting party." Lord
Sumner adds, "One's signature is not the place to advertise one's
calling, nor is 'agent' ordinarily used to describe a trade, as 'tailor'
or 'butcher' would he." This dictum, coming from such a court,
should be a weighty influence, but its adoption as the law in the
future must necessarily mean the rejection. in exceptional instances,
of logical rules of construction of long standing in favor of extremely loose business methods.
IV. C. F., Jr.
AIANUFACTURERS LIABILITY TO PERSONS NOT iN PRIVIlTY OF
CON'TRAcT.-A somewhat novel application of the rules of a manufacturer's liability for injuries due to defective articles manufactured and sold, appeared in the decision of a recent New York case,
Roscnbroch v. General Electric Co.' Crane, J., in the opinion,
stated that "no distinction can be drawn between a defective instrume nt and a perfect instrument defectively and dangerously packed,
if the product when it leaves the manufacturer is in a latently defective condition, making it inherently dangerous to all who use it as
it is intended to be used."
The facts of the case were as follows: The plaintiff's intestate,
an employee of the Niagara Power Company, was killed in an explosion caused by a short circuit in transformers, manufactured and
sold to the Power Company by the defendant company. The transformers, though not defective in themselves, were packed for shipment so as to be defective for use. Wooden blocks, which should
have been removed before the transformers were used, caused the
short circuit. The Power Company did not remove them because it
did not know of their presence, all previous transformers sent to it
by the defendant having been ready for use, except for certain
routine preparations. The defendant was aware that vendees would
probably not remove the blocks, for it usually sent printed warnings to remove them. with transformers containing them. No such

IN.

Y. Court of Appeals, 4th Dpt. (July 13,

1923), No. 1398.

NOTES.

wanings came with tho:ue in que:tion.
ant lialle.

The court held the defend-

The general rule, based ont a misconception 2 of IVinterbottom 'u.
IVrght,3 is that a manufacturer is liable for injuries resulting fron
his negligence in the nuanuiacture or sale of articles.4 only to persons
in privity of contract--that is. the immediate vendee.
Two reasons have been assigned for the rule. The first is that
the immediate vendee in taking possession of the article and in bringing third persons within the sphere of danger. acts as a conscious intervening agent, breaking the ch-in of causation between the manufacturer's negligence and the injury to the third person." However,
on strict principles of tort law, the chain of causation is not so
broken, provided the maker or vendor can foresee that others besides the vendee will probably enter the sphere of danger, as is the
case today in the manufacture of most articles, which are sold to
dealers or are intended to be used by or near many persons.
The second reason is that it is too great a burden to put upon
the manufacturer a duty to turn out a perfect article, not injurious
to any one who may use it.' But no such duty would be put upon
h;;lhe has a duty only to use reasonable care. Should he not have
such a duty? A general principle of the law casts a duty. on everyone exercising a trade or profession to exercise it with due care.,
A realization that the general rule limiting the maker's liability,
could not be justifiably enforced in all cases, led the courts to make
two exceptions,8 under which he is liable to third persons:
(i)
\Vhere the article manufactured and sold is, in its nature "imminently dangerous" to human life, he.is liable to those injured by a.
latent defect, who, he can foresee, will probably use it.9 (2) Where
the article manufactured and sold. though not in itself "imminently
dangerous," contains a latent defect, making it dangerous for use
'Cited as authority for the rule that a maker is liable only to person
in privity of contract for defects of original construction. No original defect was alleged in the case; merely a lack of repair. See Bohlen, Affirnative Obligations in Tort Law, 44 Am. L Reg. (N. S.) 28i.
2 io M. & V. io7 (Eng. 1842).
'Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70, 21 AtI. 244 (1891); Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Co., 194 Mass. 34, 8o N. E. 482 (1907); Bragdon v. PerkinsCampbell Co., 87 Fed. iog, 3o-C. C. A. s67 (1898).
'Huset v. J. S. Case Threshing Machine Co., t2o Fed. 865, 57 C. C. A.
237 (i9o3) ; Wharton, Negligence (2d ed.), Sec. 134.
'Curtin v. Somerset, supra in note 4; Heizer v. Kingsland &. Douglas
Mfg. Co., iO Mo. 6oS, 19 S. W. 630 (1892).
'See Bohlen, supra in note 2, 293.
'See opinion in Huset v. J. S. Case Threshing ,Machine Co., supra in
note 5.
'Thomas v. Winchester. 6 N. Y. 397 (1852) ; Norton v. Sewall, io6 Mass.
143 (i87o); Texas Drug Co. v. Caldwell. 237 S. NV. 968 (Texas 1922).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAIV REVIEW

54

as intended, and the maker or vendor knows of the defect, but fails
to notify the vendee, he is liable to those injured by it."'
The term "imminently dangerous" 11 has usually been construed
to mean "inherently" or "intrinsically" dangerous '--articles dangerous by their very nature--defined as those intended to protect,
destroy, or affect life, such as drugs, explosives and firearms.'- But
the courts in some jurisdictions have stretched the term to include
articles which, though not dangerous in themselves, become highly
dangerous when used as intended, unless safely and properly made.
The New York courts were first "4 to extend the meaning of
this term and have continued to extend it in a line of consistent deMassachusetts," and
cisions 11 till it covers even an automobile."
courts
Texas,"s have a tendency to follow New York. The Federal
were formerly narrow in their construction of this term,"0 but a
United States Circuit Court of Appeals recently directly overruled
its own decision rendered on a former appeal of the same case,2 to
follow New York as to automobiles. In Pennsylvania the last cases
relating to the subject, which has not rdcently arisen, merely uphold
the general rule without reference to exceptions. 21 It is difficult to deone way or the other from the English cases on this
rive a principle
22
question.

Under the second exception, the requirement that the maker
"Clarke v. Army & Navy Co-op. Soc., i K. B. i55 (Eng. 1903); Lewis
v. Terry, iii Cal. 39, 43 Pac. 398 (1896); Huset v. Threshing Machine Co.,
supra,in note 5; Krahn v. Owens Co., 225 Minn. 33, x45 N. W. 626 (9x4).
'Used first in Thomas v. Winchester, supra in note 9.

'See

opinion, Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co.,

220

Mass. 593, io8

N. E. 474 (1915).

" See opinion. Huset v. Threshing Machine Co., supra in note 5. See
also Larabee v. Des Moines Tent and Awning Co., 178 N. W. 373 (Iowa
i92o); Windram Mfg. Co. v.Boston Blacking Co., 239 Mass. 123, 232 N. B.
454 (i92); Laudeman v. Russell & Co., 46 Ind. App. 32, 9 N. F_. 822
(19io).
"Devlin v.Smith, 89 N. Y: 470 (1882).
'Torgeson v.Schultz, 292 N. Y. x56, 84 N. E. 956 (x9o8); Statler v.
Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N. Y. 478, 88 N. F_. io63 (i909).
"MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, ii N. E. 1oo (1916).
"'Thornhill v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 22o Mass. 593, xo8 N. E. 474
(915) ; "walnut oil stain" held imminently dangerous, yet in Kusick v.
Thorndike & Hix, Inc., 224 Mass. 413, 122 N. F_. o25 (xpir), a can of lime,
and in Pitinan v. Lynn Gas & Elec. Co., 241 Mass. 322, 135 N. E. 223 (1922),
a gas flat-iron, held contra.
,Soap, in Armstrong Packing Co. v. Clem, 151 S. W: 576 (Tex. 29m2).
"Huset v. Threshing Machine Co., supra in note 5.
See also
"Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 261 Fed. 878 (19).
Herman v. Markham Air-Rifle Co., 258 Fed. 475 (xpx8).
'Curtin v. Somerset, supra in note 4, and Congregation v. Smith, 263
Pa. 561, 3o At. 279 (1894).
" See opinion in MacPherson v.Buick Co., supra in note i6, 388.

.NOTES

know of the defect. hai in some cases ieen stretched to read merely
"ought to have known," in order to hold the maker liable.21
The tendcncv to broaden the two exceptions to the rule would
seem to lead ultimately to a denial of the rule itself and to a basing
of the niaker,; liability to third persons on general principles of tort
law.- Cardozo. J.. in the New York Court of Appeals 24 approaches
this very nearly 2 when lie says: "'The principle tat! the dhnger
must be imminent does not change. but die things subject to the
principle do change. They are wharever the needg of life in. a developing civilization require them to be." The case of Henry v.
Crook."' which seems to deny the general rule. may be distinguished,
in that the plaintiff was the immediate veiide.
In the principal case. Rosenbroch v,. General Electric Co., the
defendant would seem to be liable under tile second. exception to the
general rule: liability to third persons if the vendor knew of the defect and failed to notify the vendee. The (efendant knew the blocks
were in the transformer-put them there purposeyI-aud knew of
the danger due to the -probability that the Power Company would
not remove them, for it was its custon to send notices warning
vendees to remove the blocks before using the transformers. Yet
it negligently failed to send these notices to the Power Company.
If this case were decided on this ground. it is undoubtedly in1 line
with the decisions of most jurisdictions.!"
However. the court Stl)ports its decision by cases -2

falling un-

der the first exception-cases which extend the term "imminently
dangerous." and where the maker did not know of the concealed
defects. On- this ground. that the transformers were "imminently
dangerous" for use as intended dlue to defects caused- by the negligence of the maker, the case falls in line with those cases, though
the facts are somewhat novel.
Hitherto in those cases the danger has been due to a defect in
the article itself. Here it was a perfect article, yet the manner of
packing rendered it defective for use as sent. The result is the
same. whether defective due to packing or due to construction. The
transformers were defective for use as intended and the defendant
could foresee that, in the absence of warning, they would probably be
"Tomlinson v. Armour & Co.- 75 N. J. L. 748, 7o Atl. 314 (1907) ; Olds
Motor Co. v. Shaffer, 145 Ky. 616, 140 S. W. 1047 (i911); Davidson v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 171 Il. App. 355 (1912).

"In MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra in note I6.
"Though it is claimed (2o HARv. L. REv. 866-868) that Cardozo, J., cast
aside the exception entirely in this case.
'95

N. Y. S.

642 (1922).

' See supra in note 9.
= Some of which are: Devlin v. Smith, supra in note 14; Torgeson v.
Schultz, and Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co.. supra in note i5; MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., supra in note 16.
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used as sent, would blow up, and injure persons in their vicinity,
and -hecould foresee that there would probably be employees of the
Power Company in their vicinity when they were used.
Therefore, in this case the defendant was correctly held liable
on the principles of the broad New York view', though the decision
is an extension of that view to cover a slightly new situation.
G.S.S.

THE LIABILITY OF A SuB-AGENT BANK FOR THE PROCEEDS OF A

of Spokane & Eastern Trust
Co. v. United Statcs Steel Products Company' presents a number of
interesting aspects, because of the problems of law involved and the
unusual complexity of its facts. In order to present the issue properly, and to make it in some degree understandable, it is necessary
to reduce the statement of the case to its simplest terms, and to eliminate from consideration all unnecessary parties to the transactions
which took place.-' When this is done, it appears that the dispute
arose in the following manner:
The X Bank sent the check of the plaintiff, its depositor, to the
Z Bank, the drawee. The latter sent it thirough the clearing house,
and obtained two drafts on metropolitan banks, which were forwarded to the Y Bank, the defendant. At the same time the drawee
bank drew its draft on the defendant in favor of the X Bank for the
amount of the original check. Before this latter draft was presented to the defendant the drawee bank failed and the defendant
refused payment, since it had already applied the proceeds of the
two drafts to the pre-existing indebtedness of the drawee bank to it.
The plaintiff then demanded that the defendant pay over to it the
COLLECTED DRAFT.-The recent case

proceeds of the draft and the defendant again refused. The plaintiff then brought suit against the defendant and recovered. The
court held that the proceeds of a check in the hands of the colz29o Fed. 884 (C. C. A. z923).
'The corriplete statement, as contained in the report, is as follows: The
A Company drew a check on the B Bank in favor of the C Company, the
plaintiff. The latter deposited it in the D Bank for collection. The D Bank
forwarded the check to the B Bank, through whom it made collections. The
B Bank was not a member of the local clearing house, but cleared through
the E Bank. The E Bank received the check, cleared it and turned over to the
B Bank in payment two drafts, one drawn on the F Bank, and one on the G
Bank. Instead of forwarding any of the proceeds of the check to the'D Bank,
the B Bank transmitted the drafts to the H Bank, the defendant. It then
drew a draft on the H Bank in favor of the D Bank. The H Bank cashed
the drafts it received, credited the proceeds to the B Bank and then charged
back to the B Bank certain re-discounts, bearing the B Bank's endorsement.
In this way it applied all the proceeds of the plaintiff's check. Payment of
the draft in favor of the D Bank was refused, since the B Bank was insolvent. The C Company then brought suit against the H Bank.

NOTES

lecting bank constituted a trust fund. In addition the officers
of the drawee bank knew of its insolvency when it received the
check, and therefore had no authority to make a collection..
It is difficult to understand the transaction. Assuming that the
reporter has correctly stated the facts, the first- question which at
once presents itself is. why should a bank, which receives a check
drawn upon itself, send it through the clearing house? In ordinary
practice it would merely debit the account of the maker of the check
and then transfer the amount for which the check was drawn to the
transun:tting bank, either by a credit on its books, or by a draft. To
send the Uieck drawn upon itself through the clearing house would
he of no profit to it and would only result in making its bookkeeping
inore complicated.
l-ht let us assume that the drawee bank actually did send the
check to the clearing house. Immediately the question arises as to
how it could receive in payment drafts on another bank. The clearing house. it must be remembered, is an institution for the settlement of differences between banks without the actual transfer of
cash. At the beginning of a day each bank in a given locality will
have in its possession checks dirawn on every other bank. At the
same time, every other bank will hold checks d.wn upon it. To
avoid the endless labor of presenting every item for payment directly
to the bank on which it is drawn, all checks are sent to a single point
and "cleared." The clearing house, an association of which each
bank is a member, credits a bank for each check it presents drawn on
another bank; it debits every member for each check which other
banks present drawn upon it. At the end of the (lay the bank has
either a debit or a credit balance with the clearing house.
With this explanation in mind. let us consider again the statement of facts in the report. The drawee bank sends the check in
question to the clearing bouse and the clearing house credits it with
the amount of the check. But since the check is drawn on the bank,
the clearing house must immediately debit it with the same amount.
How is it possible under these circumstances for the drawee bank
to receive drafts on metropolitan centers for the amount of the
check ? 3
rhere is another objection which must be raised. In the United
States it is not considered proper to send a check to the drawee
batik for collection.4 It is usually forwarded to another bank in the
same locality, to he presented by it to the drawee. The reason for
this is clear; the drawee bank is an interested part), in the transaction, hence it should not at the same time be the agent of the credOn the general subject of clearing see: Cannon. Clearing Houses; Thralls,
The Clearing House; Phillips. Readings in Money and Banking, Chapter 17;
Agger, Organized Banking, Chapter 6.
'7 C. J.6o8; i Morse, Banks & Banking (5th ed. 1917), 472.
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itor or ,esini qie trust. Some disinterested third party should be
eniploycd. It is usually held that when the transmitting bank forwards a check to the drawee for collection it is guilty of negligence
and is liable to the depositor if the drawee surrenders the draft to
the drawer as paid and remits worthless paper which, because of its
subsequent failure, is never honored.
It is difficult to understand the case on the above basis. It seems
probable that there is an error in the reported statement of the facts.
A slight change would render the whole situation perfectly clear. and
would make the reasoning of the court intelligible. The report says
that the check under discussion was drawn on the Z Bank. Later it
states that the X Bank sent it for collection to the Z Bank, its corre.l)ondent. This, as we have indicated, causes all the complication.
But suppose that the first statement were incorrect, and .that in fact
the check was drawn on the A Bank. Such an assumption would
explain everything. The act bf the X Bank in sending the check to
its correspondent, the Z Bank, for collection would be perfectly
proper. The process of clearing the check would he in accordance
with banking practice. The presence of the drafts on metropolitan
banks would be explained. The question would resolve itself into
an interesting, but not unusual problem in the law of trusts. Furthermore, it must be pointed out that the opinion written by the
judge of the Federal Court supports this reconstructed statement
of the facts. In it he treats the Z Bank -as if it were the collecting
bank which was to secure the proceeds of the check from some other
institution, and not as if it were the drawee, who was merely to debit
the drawer and to remit funds which it already had.
Looked at from this point of view. we meet again the question
which has been raised many times To whom do the proceeds of an
instrument deposited for collection belong? It is an elementary
proposition that when one deposits money in a bank. the agreement
is not that the bank shall keep that specific money on hand, to'be
paid back whenever the depositor asks for it. The bank merely
promises to owe the depositor that amount, and to pay him on demand out of whatever funds it may have on hand. In other words,
the bank does not hold the cash deposited in trust; it acquires complete title to it, and may use it in any way it sees fit. It is the debtor
of the depositor, who has no more than a chose in action against the
bank.'
When one considers the deposits of commercial paper, the situation is a little more difficult. It is possible for the bank to become
"Merchants' National Bank v. Goodman. io9 Pa. 422, 2 At. 687 (1885);
Bank of Rocky Mount v. Floyd, 142 N. C. 187. 55 S. E. g5 (19o6); Smith
v. National Bank of D. 0. Mills & Co., 191 Fed. 226 (C. C. 19I1).
'Ames, Law of Trusts. 29. note; Foley -. Hill, 2 H. L C. 28 (1848);
Bank of the Republic v. Millard. o .Vall. 152 (U. S. 1869); Carr v. National
Security Bank, 107 'Mass. 45 (1871), (1869).
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the debtor of the depositor, just as it did when he deposited money.,
But it doeg not necessarily become a debtor. Often the bank is held
to be an agent. i. e., a trustee, who is given the paper for the specific
purpose of collection." Until this purpose is carried out, the bank
does not owe the depositor anything. It has the authority to collect
the check or the note, but the depositor has the eqtitable title, and
may recover the instrument from the bank for any sufficient fchson.!, Sometimes the depositor will indorse hig cheek "'or ecollection-: "' sometimes the bank will include iii the pass-bool a pi'lisidn"
that it shall act only as the agent of the depositor." In sticli Cases
there can be no doubt as to the relationship which exists.
But the monlent the collecting bank has carried out the nissioti
which was entrusted to it, and has collected the instrumet, the better view. denied by only a few cases.' 2 is that the relationship between the parties changes. Where. before, the collecting bank was
a trustee of the check, it is now merely indebted to the depositor,
just as it would have been. had it received a deposit of cash. This
is because the bank, having received the proceeds. has the right to
mix them with its own funds. The trust has been superseded by a
debt.13
When a check is (drawn on a distant banc and is forwarded to

a correspondent for collection, with specific instructious to collect
2ad to remit the proceeds, there is a stronger basis for argument
that a trust irLsuch proceeds exists until the fivnd's are ill tfe' hanids
of the depositor's bankY4 The majority of cases say that it does
'Capital & Counties Bank v. Gordon, (r9o3) A. C. 2-4o (Eng.); Taft v.
Quinsigamond National Bank, i72 Mass. 363, 52 N. E. 387 (1899); Anderson,, e al., v. Keystone Chemical Supply Co., 293 Ill.
468, 127 N. E. 668
(1920).

RRichardson Y. Continental National Bank, 94 Fed. 450, 36 C. C. A. 315
( 899); Morris Miller Co. v. Von Pressentin, 63 Wash. 74, 114 Pac. 912.
(1911).
'As, for example, the insolvency of the collecting bank before the collection is made. See infra, note iS.
" First National- Bank v. Gregg & Co., 79 Pa. 384 (1875) ; Manufacturers'
National Bank v. Continental Bank, 148 Mass. 553, 20 N. H. 193 (1889);
Old Nationar Bank of Evansville v. German American Nat. Bank, 155 U. S.
556 (i8gs).
"South Park Foundry *&Machine Co. v. Chicago, Great Western Ry., 75
Minn. x86, 77 N. W. 796 (x899).
"Nurse v. Satterlee, 81 Iowa 491, 46 N. W. 11o2 (i8go) ; State v. Bank
of Commerce, 6x Neb. i81, 85 N. W. 43 (go) ; Kansas State Bank v. First
State Bank, 62 Kan. 788, 64 Pac. 634 (go1).
"Marine Bank v. Fulton Bank, 2 Wall. 252 (U. S. 1864); National
Butchers' & Drovers' Bank v. Hubbell, 117 N. Y. 384, 22 N. E. 1031 (i889);
United States Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Glanton, 146 Ga. 786, 92 S. E. 625
(1917).
"4 Holder v. West German Bank, 136 Fed. go; 68 C. C. A. 554 (19o5);
Brown v. Sheldon State Bank; 139 Iowa 83, 117 N. V. 289 (1908); State
National Bank v. First National Bank of Atchison, 124 Ark. 531, 187 S. AV.
673 (9x6).
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exist, because such instructions show that the collecting bank theoretically should keep the proceeds separate from its own funds and
remit imnediately.'- According to this reasoning, equitable title to
the instrument or proceeds never passes out of the original depositor.
Should the collecting bank become insolvent, he has priority, over the
creditors of the hank. If the collecting bank dislnses of the proceeds instead of iniuediately remitting them, the depositor may follow them as long a,; they can be traced.
On the other hand, it is contended by certain courts that, even
where instructions are' given to collect and remit, no trtist, but a
mere debt. exists."
The reasoning on which they proceed is that
in general practice specific funds are never remitted by collecting
hanks; that all settlements between the sub-agent and the agent
banks are made by debits and credits on the books, or by draft on
some third institution. The party who employs a bank to make collections is presumed in the absence of some special agreement to assent to the carry;ng on of the transaction in the usual manner.1 7
If a bank nmakes a collection after it has gone into bankruptcy,
or when its officers know that it is hopelessly insolvent, the proceeds o' that collection constitute a. trust fund. Insolvency on the
part of the bank terminates its authority to make collections. Any
commercial paper which it has received for collection should be left
untouched, so that the depositor who has the beneficial ownership
may reclaim it. For its officers to collect a check whe'n they realize
that their institution is not in a position to carry on business is a
fraud. In such a case the depositor will be protected.1s
Returning to a discussion of Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. u,.
United States Sic'! Products Co.," it appears at once that the decision is fully justified by the second reason which the court gives,
"If it is agreed between the remitting and the collecting banks that the
latter shall remit only at certain times, a different result follows, because'
such an agreement indicates that the collecting bank has the right to mix the
proceeds of the collections with its own funds. Commercial Bank of Pennsylvania v.Armstrong, 148 U. S. 5o (1892).
"First Nat. Bank of Richmond v. Davis, 114 N. C. 343, i9 S. E. 280
(1894) Union National Bank v. Citizens' Bank, 53 Ind. 44, 54 N. . 97
(1894), Young v. Teutonia Bank, 134 La. 879, 64 So. 8o6 (1914). See also
IHecker, etc., Milling Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., z42 Mass. 18r, 136 N. E.
333 (1922).
' "One who collects commercial paper througb the agency of banks must
be held impliedly to contract that the business may be done according to their
well-known usages, so far as to permit the money collected to be mingled
with the funds of the collecting bank." Knowlton, J., in Freeman's National
Bank v. National Tube Works Co., 151 Mass. 413, 418, 24 N. E. 779 (i89o).
" Orrne & Okey v. Baker. 74 Ohio St. 337, 78 N. F_ 439 (906); Pennington v. Third National Bank of Columbus, 114 Va. 674, 77 S. E. 455
(1913) ; Clark, etc.. Co. v. Americus National Bank, 230 Fed. 738 (D. C.
ti6).
"Supra in note t.
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namely, that the officers of the Z Bank kncw of its insolvcncy. and
hence had no authority to collect the check. The proceeds were a
trust fund. Furthermore. the evidence shows that the defendant
bank was fully informed of the whole transaction ;,ithat it knew
that the drafts were sent to it to cover a draft in favor of the X
Bank.
As to the correctness of the court's first reason, we have seen
that there is a complete split of authority. The court follows the
majority view. in holding that the proceeds of paper sent for collection and remittance constitute a trust. But it is submitted that
the reasnning of the minority is more logical, when the prevailing
practice among banks is considered. The proceeds are mixed in the
common fund of the collecting bank. The latter remits, not the
very nioney received. but an ambunt of equal value. The specific
rcs which is ordinarily one of the basic elements of a trust disappears. Only a debt remains.
C. W. F.

A BANK AS A I-OIE-R FOR VALUE oF Di.ros;TFj) NEGOTIABLE
I XSTRU.ENTS.-It is a common practice for a bank to receive checks
or other negotiable instruments from a depositor and to credit the
proceeds to his account. But there is a conflict of authority with
regard to the stage in the transaction at which the bank is considered
as having given value so as to become a holder of the instrument in
due course, and thereby exclude any defenses available to the maker
or drawer as against the payee.
Since this note* will be confined only to the question of when
value has been given, it is assumed that the bank has fulfilled all
other requircients of a holder in due course.' namely, that the instrument is complete and regular on its face, that the bank took it
before maturity and without notice of dishonor, in good faith, and
without notice of any defect in title or infirmity in the instrument,
etc. This question though closely related to, should also be distinguished from the question of when title has passed to the bank.
Clearly a bank can acquire title to the paper as against the depositor
and his creditors so that it could sue in its own name, and yet not
be a holder in due course so as to be frte of all defenses.
The Negotiable Instruments Law in section 52 (3) states that to
become a holder in due course the instrument must be taken for
value. And in section 25 it defines value as "any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract"; and in section 26 a holder for
value is defined as follows: "Where value has at any time been given
for the instrument, the holder is deemed a holder for value in respect
to all parties who became such prior to that time."
I N. I. L., sce.

52.
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Four general ituations arise involving the question whether
or not the bank has given value for the instrument. The first is
where the bank receives a deposit containing checks, or discounts a
note, and merely credits the depositor's account with the amount
,thdreof. without doing anything more. Almost all jurisdictions in
the United States with but two or three exceptions have held that
this does not constitute the hank a holder for value both at common
law and under the Negotiable Instruments Law.2 But in England
and Canada the bank has been considered a holder for value from
the moment it has credited the depositor's account with the amount
of the deposit regardless of the status of the account. 3 A very few
jurisdictions in this country have followed the English decisions. 4
The courts in their decisions have generally made no distinction
between the kinds of instruments involved, applying the same rules
to promissory notes. checks, etc.5 But several jurisdictions have
made an exception in the case of draifts with bills of lading attached,
atnd have held that the mere crediting of the amount to the depositor's account is sufficient to constitute the bank a holder for value.6
The motive of these courts has been to aid commercial transactions
involving the ral)id moving of crops. 'But other courts have failed
to make this distinction and apply the same rules to drafts with bills
of lading attached as to other commercial paper.The view of the majority of American jurisdictions under this
first situation un'questionably is the better one, since it takes into consideration the established banking practice. That neither the bank
nor depositor consider the mere crediting as an absolute payment
is evidence:l by the fact that most banks specifically provide on their
pass-books or deposit slips that all checks deposited that are drawn
City Deposit Bank v: Green. 130 Ia. 384, io6 N. W. 94W (1906); Citizens' State Bank v. Cowles, i8o N. Y. 346, 73 N. E. 33 (igo5); Tatum v.
Commercial Bank, t85 Ala. 249, 64 So. 561 (1914) ; Merchants' National Bank
v. Marden, 234 Mass. 16t, 125 N. E. 384 (igig); Varney v. National City
Bank, 139 N. E. 326 (Ind. 1923). See notes in 6 A. L. R. 252 and 24 A. L.
R. 901, and cases cited therein.
Ex parte Richdale, L. R. i9 Ch. Div. 409 (Eng. i88); Royal Bank v.
Tottenham. L. R. 2 Q. B. 715 (Eng. 1894); Bank of British North America
v. Warren. i9 Ont. L. Rep. 257 (Can. 19o9).
'Wheeler v. First National Bank, 3 Tex. App. Civ, .as. 152 (1886);
National Bank of Commerce v. Bossemeyer, 16z N. W. 503 (Neb. 1917). See
17 COL. L. Rav. 631 (1917).
'First National Bank v. Wills Creek Coal Co., i io Mich. 447, 68 N. V.
232 (8w6);
Standard Trust Co. v. Commercial National Bank, 24o Fed. 3o3,
i53 C. C. A. 229 (1917).
'Lewis v. Small, 1i7 Tenn. 153, 96 S. W. io5i (906); Tapee v. VardeyWolter Co.. i84 Mo. App. 470. 17, S. W. ig (i9o6); National Bank of Commerce v. Bossemeyer, supra in note 4. (But court does not consider the bill
of lading in arriving at the decision.)
National Bank of Commerce v. Morgan, 207 Ala. 65, 92 So. 10 (1921);
Worth v. International Sugar Co.. 9o . E. 295 (N. C. 1i96).
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on other banks are received only for collection. In absence of any
special agreement the courts have held that where a check is specially
endorsed "for collection" the bank is only an agent for collection
until the funds are collected, and the credit is only a conditional
one." And even where the instrument is generally endorsed and the
hank is regarded as a debtor. ' as of cash deposited. the purpose of
the crediting is to facilitate bookkecping. And in the event that the
check is returned "uncollected," instead of proceeding against the
depositor on his endorsement, the bank merely cancels the credit/and
returns the check to him. Clearly, therefore, the bank has parted
with nothing of value and is not entitled to be considered a holder
in due course."'
The second situation arises where the bank credits the depositor s account with the proceeds and then permits hint to draw out the
full amount by check or draft, or otherwise to exhaust the credit
given. m when the bank applies the proceeds to an overdraft 11 or
to pay off a debt due the bank by the depositor. 2 All jurisdictions
under these circumstances consider the bank a holder for value,1
and rightly so. because the depositor has received a consideration.
Whether the bank has made the payment on the strength of the paper
deposited, or, in fact, upon the credit of the depositor, or upon both,
makes no difference in the result."' And in accord with the recent
Mississippi case of Bank o f Gulfport v. Smith,' the weight of authority has held the bank a holder for value even where it received
the instrument "for collection" and entered the deposit conditionally,
but subsequently permitted the depositor to withdraw the full
anount of the credit." But there are decisions to the contrary."
'Commercial Bank v. Armstrtong, 39 Fed. 684 (1889); National Bank v.
Hubbell, 117 N. Y. 384 (1889); and dicta in Commercial National Bank v.
Citizens' State Bank, 132 Ia. 7o6, jog N. W. 198 (1907).
'See 61 U. oF PA. L. Rav. io6 (1912).
"Union National Bank v. Winsor, lOI Minn. 470, 112 N. W. Mg9 (1907).
"Hamilton Mach. Tool Co. v. Memphis National Bank, 84 Ohio St 184,
95 N. 1. 777 (1911).
" Hatch v. National Bank, 147 N. Y. 184 (o8D5) ; Wallabout Bank v. Pey-"
ton, 123 App. Div. 727, io8 N. Y. S. 42 (19o8).
'Hatch v. National Bank, supra in note 12; Ironbound Trust Co. v.
Schmidt-Dauber Co., 169 N. Y. S. .524, IO2 Misc. 408 (igi8) ; Central Savings
Bank Y. Wachman, 221 Mich. 512. 191 N. W. 5 (1922); City Deposit Bank v.
Green, supra in note 2.
" Bank of Gulfport v.Smith. 95 So. 785 (Miss. 1923).
'95 So. 785 (Miss. 1923), three judges dissenting.
"Old National Bank v. Gibson, 1o5 Wash. 578, 179 Pac. 117 (1919),
overruling American Saving Bank v. Dennis, go Wash. 547, 156 Pac. 559
(1916) ; Bank of Gulfport Y. Smith, supra in note i4: Jefferson Bank v. Merchants' Refrigerating Co., 236 Mo. 407, 139 S. W. 545 (1911).
" First National Bank v. Stengel, 169 N. Y. S. 217 (1918) ; Morrison v.
Farmers' & M. Bank. 9 Okla. 697, 6o Pac. 273 (i9oo).
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"rhe third situation arises when tie depositor has what is known
in banking circles as an "active account," and makes deposits and
draws checks from day to day. It is frequently difficult to decide
whether he has drawn out all or even part of the instrument in question. Thus, where the depositor has withdrawn an amount equal to
or more than the balance on hand at the time the instrument was deposited plus the amount of the deposit in question, but has made
other deposits which have at all times maintained a balance in his
favor in excess of the instrument in question, is the bank a holder
for value?
There is a flat split of authority on this question. The apparent
weight of authority, however, is that the bank is a holder for value
when the full amount of the balance plus the deposit has
been withdrawn, in spite of the fact that the balance was
kept up by subsequent deposit.M These decisions are based on
the theory that "the first money in is the first money out." But
it is submitted that this is an anomalous doctrine, since it assumnes as a basis that deposits made at different times are kept
separately, whereas, by the weight of authority, the bank is
considered a debtor to the amount of the check before collection, unless the deposit is especially ear-marked.Y It is therefore difficult
to understand how the bank can be regarded as paying out any particular funds first. Furthermore. the deposited checks can hardly be
considered as "money" in the halnds of tie bank until it receives the
proceeds from the collecting bank. Another difficulty with this doctrine. which the courts have generally failed to consider, arises when
the deposits which are made subsequent to the one containing the instrument in question. but prior to the withdrawals, contains an
amount in actual cash equal to or greater than the amount of the instrument in question. In this event the bank has cash on hand to meet
the withdrawals long before it receives the proceeds upon the checks.
This is particularly true in the case of checks that are drawn upon
banks located at a distance, because members of the Federal Reserve
system, in order to determine the amount of deposits upon any given
day against which they are required to keep a reserve with the Federal Reserve Bank, allow from two to nine days or more to elapse, depending upon the distance of the drawee bank, before considering
that item as a part of the depositor's balance on hand. It is natural
to assume, therefore, that according to the doctrine itself, these cash
items would be the first to be used up by advances. But the courts
wholly disregard the distinction between cash and check items.
"First National Bank v. McNairy, 122 Minn. 215, 142 1. W. 139 (1913);
Standard Trust Co. v. Commercial National Bank, 240 Fed. 303 (1917);
State Savings Bank v. Krug. io8 Kan. soS, 193 Pac. 899 (1920); First National Bank v. McNair, i4 N. C. 335, i9S. E. 361 (1894). See 69 TJ. OF PA.
L. REv. 378 (1921).
"See 61 U. OF P.. L REv. io6 (.1912).
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The comparatively recent case of National Bank of Coutincrce

zy. Morgan,20 however, held the contrary view, deciding that the
bank is not a holder for value so long as there is any balance on
hand equal to the amount of the instrument in question. This doc-1
trine is supported " on the theory that the bank can charge off
against that balance any advances made. This would be true if the
subsequent deposits were composed of cash, as explained above.
But it is difficult to understand how the subsequent deposits can be
considered as funds- against which advances may be charged, which
would result in the bank's becoming a holder for value of the instruments contained therein, when the prior deposits are not so
considered.
It is submitted, however, that in the absence of any cash items
the practice of the majority jurisdictions in applying the first withdrawals against the first checks deposited is both practical and fair.
But each case should be decided on the exact status of the depositor's account rather than upon any preconceived doctrine such as
"the first mondy in is the first money out."
The fourth situation does not concern the question of whether
or not the bank is'a holder for value as did the preceding ones, but
having determined that it is, instead involves the extcnt to which it
is a holder for value. It arises where the bank has paid out an
amount equal to only a part of the proceeds of the instrument in
question, and applies both whei'e the instrument is treated by itself,
as in the second situation, supra, and where subsequent deposits
have been made which leave a credit balance in the depositor's favor,
as in the third situation, supra.
At common law, several decisions and dicta in a few others,
have held that to become a holder in due course the bank must
have exhausted the full amount of the credit arising out of the iristrument in question.'
But by the clear weight, of authority the
bank need not pay out the full amount to become a holder in due'
23
course.
Several jurisdictions have, however, gone further and decided that even if only a substantial part of the amount credited is
withdrawn before notice of the defect, the bank may recover the full
face value of the instrument. 4
"2o7 Ala. 65, 92 So. io (x92i).

" Port Washington v. Polonia Phonograph Co., x92 N.

V. 472 (Wis.

1923).

'Citizens' National Bank v. Buckheit, 14 Ala. App. 51i 71 So. 82 (1916);
Tatum v. Commercial Bank, supra in note i; and dicta in State v. Emery,
spra in note 13; and Merchants' National Bank v. Santa Maria Sugar Co.,
162 App. Div. 248, 147 N. Y. S. 498 (1914).
'Warman v. First National Bank, x85 Ill. 6o, 57 N. E. 6 (xgoo); Security Bank v. Petruschke, toi Minn. 478, 112 N. W. iooo (1907); U. S. National Bank v. McNair, IT4 N. C. 335, 19 S. E.361 (x894); Re Grocers' Baking Co., 266 Fed. goo (192o), affirmed in -77 Fed. ios (i92t).
'West Minneapolis First National Bank v. Pearsall, no Minn. 333, 125
N. W. 5o6 (xgio); Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. National Bank of. Portland,
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The provisions concerning value in the Nigotiable Instruments
Law are sufficiently general to permit the courts to follow their previous line of decisions on- all of the situations !" except the fourth
one. In the latter case the statute has evidently made a change.
Section 54 of the N. I. L. provides that
"Where the transferee receives notice of any infirmity in
the instrument or defect in title of the person negotiating the
same before he has paid the full amount agreed to be paid
therefore, he will he deemed a holder in due course only to the
extent of the amount thcretofore paid by him." 20
And Section 27 provides that:
'*Where the holder has a lien upon the instrument arising
either from contract or by implication of law, he is deemed a
holder to the extent of the lien." .
Decisions made under both these sections have held that the
bank is a holder in due course only to the amount of the proceeds
actually withdrawn from the depositor's account before the bank
had notice of the infirmities in the paper.-" A receni case in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Mutual Trust Co. v. Parriisri;, is in
accord with this view, but the court seems to have failed' to- take
the opportunity to decide flatly that the bank is not a holder for
value beyond the amount advanced, which, appears to have been
the actual question in issue. It therefore seems that the N. L L. has
changed the law in those jurisdictions that previously held either
187 Fed. 746 (1911); U. S. National Bank v. McNair, supra in note 23;.Bland
v. Fidelity Trust Co., 71 Fla. 499, 7I So. 630 (i916).
"First National Bank v. Denfield, supra in note i3; State v. Emery, supra
in note 13.

"Italics ours.
"Italics ours.
' National Bank v. Bonsor, 38 Pa. Super. 27,5 (909); Lightfoot v. Bunnel, 76 Pa. Super. 468 (1921): Second National Bank v. Breitung, 2o3 App.
Div. 636, 197 N. Y. S. 375 (1gz).
2" 76 Pa. 422 (1923).
Defendant gave a check to X, which X de'posited
with other checks in the plaintiff bank, and was credited with, the amount
thereof. Prior tO this deposit X's account was overdrawn. Thereafter there
was a credit balance in his favor less than the amount of the instrument in
question. X became bankrupt and defendant stopped payment on his check,
having a set-off against X for moneys X owed: him. Plaintiff bank claims
to be a holder for value of defendant's check, and sues thereon. tteld: Plaintiff bank is a bona fide holder for value at least to the extent of the sum paid
out by the bank on his account, and remanded for equity jurisdiction over all
the parties.
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that the full amount had to be withdrawn to constitute the bank a
holder in due course to any amount, " or that the bank would be aholder to the full amount although it. had only paid out a part
thereof.31 The view adopted by the statute is manifestly the better
one, since the bank is always protected to the amount it had actually
aidvanced before notice of the infirmity in the instrument.
S. H.S.
"'Seenote 22.
! See note 24.

